A variety of RPG-7 projectiles have been observed during the Syrian conflict, originating from a range of countries. As well as PG-7V or similar unitary HEAT projectiles from Russia, Bulgaria, China, and Egypt, a few of the more uncommon examples are as follows:

PG-7VR (Russia)

The PG-7VR projectile, seen here in Hama, is a Russian-made tandem charge HEAT round developed by the state-owned enterprise Bazalt in 1988, and designed to defeat Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA). A 64mm shaped charge is carried forward of the main shaped charge, separated by an extension boom. This charge is intended to detonate the ERA of the target vehicle, allowing the primary 105mm charge to penetrate the regular armour. It weighs in at approximately 4.5kg, has an operational range of around 200m, and is supposedly capable of penetrating up to 600mm of Rolled Homogenous Armour (RHA) after detonation of ERA by the forward charge. The primary explosive is 1.43kg of OKFOL (окфол), an HMX-based compound. A PG-7VR can also be seen in this video.

Cobra (Egypt)

The image above, captured from this video, shows an Egyptian-manufactured unitary HEAT projectile. The Cobra is a was developed by the state-owned Arab Organization for Industrialisation (الهيئة العربية للتصنيع ). A tandem charge variation, an evolution of the Cobra single-stage HEAT projectile, also exists.  The warhead of the tandem charge contains a small charge forward of the primary charge, integrated into the elongated nose probe. The projectile shown has a shorter nose probe. Both projectiles are stated as being capable of penetrating over 500mm of RHA. The projectile weighs approximately 2.25kg, and is said to have an effective range of 300m. The main charge of the projectile appears to be approximately 85mm in diameter (see comparison below).

Iranian Tandem-Charge projectile [designation unknown] (Iran)

A screenshot from this video shows an Iranian produced tandem HEAT charge projectile. Little is known about this projectile, and what OSINT is available seems to come primarily from Iranian sources. The tip of the warhead features a 30mm precursor charge that is integrated into the elongated nose probe, ahead of an 80mm main charge. The projectile weighs 2.5kg, is supposedly effective out to 300m, and is said to be able to penetrate 350mm of RHA after detonating ERA.

TBG-7V (Russia)

The TBG-7V is a thermobaric projectile developed sometime in the late 1980s. It is designed to disable enemy personnel in urban or mountainous terrain (including entrenched enemy combatants in bunkers, buildings, and the like) through a combination of heat and overpressure, but also has a secondary fragmentation effect. The blunt-nosed warhead is 105mm in diameter, and weighs approximately 4.5kg. It contains 1.9kg of 100MI-3L (100МИ-3Л) thermobaric composition, as well as 0.25kg of A-IX-1, an RDX-based compound. The effective range of the projectile is given as 200m, with a maximum range of 700m. The lethal radius of the projectile is 10m. (Photo credit: Syrian Revolution Memory Project)

OG-7V  or derivative (Russia/Bulgaria)

This screenshot (taken from a video here) shows an OG-7 (or a Bulgarian copy) anti-personnel projectile. These projectiles are designed to engage enemy personnel, disabling them through a combination of HE and fragmentation effects. The warhead has a point-detonating fuze, is 40mm in diameter (the same diameter as the expelling charge/rocket motor), and has an effective range of 180m, and a nominal maximum range of 900m`. The 2.0kg projectile contains approximately 210g of A-IX-1.

Type 69 HE Airburst / DZGI-40 (China)

The Chinese-manufactured Type 69 HE Airburst (DZGI-40) projectile features a warhead that operates in a similar fashion to ‘bounding’ anti-personnel (APERS) landmines. When the 75mm warhead strikes the ground, it is propelled upwards by a jump mechanism, and detonates at a height of approximately 2 metres. Somewhere in the region of 800 steel balls and fragments of the case are propelled outwards, giving the warhead a lethal radius of 15m. The projectile is 825mm in length, weighs 2.8kg, and has an effective range of up 1,500m. These projectiles are, unsurprisingly, designed to be employed in an anti-personnel role. They are typically outfitted with a Chinese ‘DREOI’ fuze. (Photo credit: Olivier Voisin)

This composite image was assembled by Bjørn Holst Jespersen from a variety of image sources, including video stills and reference photographs. It compares the Egyptian Cobra Tandem projectile with PG-7V, PG-7VL, and PG-7VR projectiles. The diameters of the PG-7V and PG-7VL warheads are 85mm and 93mm, respectively.

This post will be updated if and when necessary. Should you spot any interesting RPG-7 projectiles (or any other interesting small arms, light weapons, ammunition, ordnance etc. etc.) in Syria, you can always contact me. Some oddities I’ve observed include an ENERGA rifle grenade, a few RL-83 Blindicide launchers, a Beretta Model 1938/42, an FN CAL, and a host of other bits and pieces. 

Update 19/09/2012: OG-7V fragmentation round added.
Update 13/10/2012: Information on further projectiles for the RPG-7  seen in Syria can be found here.
Update 06/11/2012: Post updated to reflect further information received on Egyptian Cobra projectiles.

Much has been made of the recent BBC News article featuring an image of a shipping crate marked for delivery to the Royal Saudi Arabian Land Forces (Saudi Arabian Army), found in a Free Syrian Army base in Aleppo, Syria. Whilst the BBC article uses the term ‘Saudi weapons’ in its headline, the crate rather more likely contained small arms ammunition produced at the Lugansk Cartridge Works (LCW), in the eastern Ukrainian city of Luhansk. LCW (formerly known as ‘Soviet State Factory, Lugansk’) was a key ammunition production plant during the Soviet era, manufacturing predominantly 9×18, 5.45×39, and 7.62×39 calibre cartridges. LCW currently manufacture lead core full metal jacket (FMJ), steel core FMJ, and blank ammunition in a variety of calibres, and also manufacture ammunition from their ‘sporting-hunting’ range under contract for WOLF Performance Ammunition.

During the Soviet era, LCW produced cartridges bearing the headstamp marking ‘270’. Headstamps featuring the ‘270’ factory code have been found widely throughout conflict zones, including during the Libyan conflict in 2011 (discussed in an upcoming report from this author), in Somalia in 2010, and in many other regions. ‘270’ was used on military contract 7.62×39 ammunition as recently as 2008 (and possibly still is). Sometime around 2008, LCW began marking civilian ammunition with ‘ЛПЗ’ (Cyrillic ‘LPZ’ for Luganskij Patronnyj Zavod, or Lugansk Cartridge Works). The use of the ‘LCW’ headstamp code has been seen in literature, but has not been documented on cartridges until now. It is unknown precisely when LCW transitioned from ‘ЛПЗ’ to this marking practice.

The headstamp photo above was taken in September 2012, in the town of ad-Dana, near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Turkey and Syria. It was taken by Belgian journalist and frequent arms chronicler, Damien Spleeters. The headstamp consists of three elements: ‘LCW’ for Lugansk Cartridge Works, ‘7,62×39’ referring to the 7.62x39mm calibre of the cartridge, and ‘10’ for the year of production, 2010. The headstamp date (2010) matches the contract date seen printed on the label of the crate (17 February 2010), as the cartridges were likely shipped after this date. The cartridge case itself is of lacquered steel construction, and likely contained an FMJ projectile with either a mild steel core and lead tip filler, in the style of Russian/Soviet PS ball cartridges, or a lead core, in the style of their ‘hunting-sporting’ rounds [Update: we now know they were steel-cored projectiles; see below].

The ammunition crate is labelled as number 990 out of 1429. The crate itself is likely to have contained 1,320 or 1,400 cartridges, meaning the original contract was likely for over 1.8 million cartridges (though the actual number could vary greatly depending on the breakdown of calibre/s and quantities). The label on the crate also indicates that the sale was brokered through Dastan Engineering, a Kyrgyz firm with offices in Ukraine.

Damien Spleeters has an article on the implications of such a find, here.

Update 11/10/2012: Updated information re: LCW headstamp marking practices. Note: last confirmed ’270′ headstamp dates from 2008. Anyone with a later headstamp, please get in touch.

Update 12/10/2012: C.J. Chivers has added more to the picture, here.

Update 13/10/2012: 

C.J. Chivers posted the image above as part of his follow-up piece on the LCW crate. It shows the inner packaging of the crate, an ammunition can often referred to as a ‘spam can’ or ‘sardine can’. This factory-sealed packaging is stamped with information indicating the date of packing, cartridge type, production facility, and the powder used. The image tells us that this can contains M1943 cartridges (AKA PS ball), which are FMJ rounds with a steel core and lead tip filler. It also tells us the crate was packed at LCW on 01/05/2010, and that the cartridges contain Sunar 7,62 1/10K powder, manufactured at KGKPZ, the Russian state-owned gunpowder factory in Kazan.

Crate photo credit: BBC News
Headstamp photo credit: Damien Spleeters
Inner packaging photo credit: C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
My thanks to fellow IAA forum members and Alex Diehl for additional info. Cheers to IAA forum member ‘Hooke’ for the tip re: powder.

Should you have more images of ANY small arms ammunition in Syria, particularly headstamps or clearly marked packaging, please don’t hesitate to get in touch with me. 

What is probably an Iranian tandem HEAT projectile. Photo: Lens Young Homsi.

In the weeks since I published my first piece on RPG-7 projectiles that have been sighted in Syria, a number of people have responded to my request for further material. As C.J. Chivers notes in this post:

“The fairly small circle of competent and ethical researchers can be collaborative and collegial, and their informal networks can lead to solid conclusions and analysis that otherwise would not exist.”

He couldn’t be more correct. Often times I have turned to fellow researchers, technical specialists, or translators – almost always on an informal basis – to help me put together another piece of a given puzzle. Without such a network, much of the valuable research we conduct as individuals would exist only in a vacuum, and would be of little ‘real world’ value. In return, of course, I receive requests for assistance on a daily basis. I’m happy to help almost all of these people, time and knowledge permitting.

For this piece,  a Syrian activist, an MP.net forum member, an amateur arms researcher, and a conflict correspondent have all pitched in, providing me more material to work with. Others have assisted with translating foreign languages. Still others helped by simply getting the word out. Thanks must go to Chris, in particular, for his excellent contributions.

Cobra (Egypt)

 
These images are from an Egyptian Cobra HEAT projectile. There is an elongated nose probe forward of the warhead proper. The warhead markings read ‘Cobra’ , indicating this is a unitary Cobra projectile, rather than a Cobra Tandem round, ‘Octogen’, indicating the explosive compound HMX (likely OKFOL; 95% HMX, 5% wax), and ’2005/Sakr’, indicating the year and factory of manufacture. The tailboom bears the marking ‘SFDI’ for Sakr Factory for Development Industries, part of the the state-owned Arab Organization for Industrialisation (الهيئة العربية للتصنيع ). The projectile weight 2.75kg, has an effective range of 300m, and is thought to be approximately 85mm in diameter (see comparative image by Bjørn Holst Jespersen, here). Penetration of Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA) is given as more than 500mm.

PG-7 (Egypt)

 
This Egyptian copy of the Soviet PG-7V projectile was also produced at the Sakr Factory for Development Industries (and bears the same ‘SFDI’ mark on its tailboom as the Cobra Tandem above). The PG-7 projectile weighs 2.25kg, and is 85mm in diameter. Armour penetration is approximately 260mm of RHA, and the effective range is in the area of 350m. The markings seen on the warhead of this projectile read ‘PG-7′ and ‘Sakr/2005′, again stating the type of projectile, factory, and year of production. The green cylinder over the nose is typical of packaging for RPG-7 projectiles (usually cardboard or plastic), and is there to protect the top component of the two-part Point Initiating, Base Detonating (PIBD) fuze. Upon impact with the target, the piezoelectric element in the nose cone is deformed, generating an electrical impulse to fire the detonator at the base of the projectile.

PG-7VM (Bulgaria)

 
The PG-7VM HEAT round (at left, in top photo) was originally developed in the Soviet Union in 1969, although this particular example was produced Vazovski Mashinostroitelni Zavodi Co. (VMZ; Vazov Machine Building Factory) in Sopot, Bulgaria in 1986. An improved version of the earlier PG-7V HEAT round (the ‘M’ stands for Modernizirovanii, or ‘modernised’), the PG-7VM is capable of defeating 300mm of RHA whilst weighing in at 1.98kg, 270g less than it’s predecessor. It is 52mm longer than the PG-7V, and has a smooth, rather than fluted, nose cone. It is also a narrower design, with a diameter of 70mm, allowing for more projectiles to be carried in the ‘quiver’ type backpacks occasionally used to transport RPG rounds and making the projectile somewhat less susceptible to crosswinds. The range of the PG-7VM is comparable to the PG-7V at around 350m. The primary explosive compound is A-IX-1, a phlegmatised compound consisting of 96% RDX and 4% paraffin wax. The warhead is fuzed with the VP-7M PIBD fuze.

F-7 (DPRK)

 
Although it appears externally similar to a PG-7V HEAT round, the North Korean F-7 is actually a high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) projectile. Note the absence of the piezoelectric component of the typical PIBD fuze at the projectile’s nose (though the nose cone is made from typical PG-7 parts, and has the same profile); the F-7 features just a simple impact-activated base fuze  rather than the two-piece PIBD fuze seen in many other RPG-7 projectiles. The projectile appears to be the same length (899mm) and diameter (85mm) as a standard PG-7V, and weighs approximately 1.85kg. Rather than a shaped charge designed to penetrate the armour of fighting vehicles, the F-7 contains approximately 255 grams of an undetermined explosive compound [if anyone has information on this, please contact me], and a phenolic resin sleeve embedded with steel balls forming a fragmentation matrix. The cutaway photo below shows the absence of a forward fuze component, as well as a cross-section of the phenolic fragmentation sleeve. The X-ray image below clearly shows the distribution and location of the steel fragmentation spheres. There have been reports of Libyan groups providing, or attempting to provide, North Korean F-7 projectiles to the FSA [Note: this is a known pro-Assad government website].

Credit: the author of these two images wishes to remain anonymous.

PG-7VL

The projectile at right in the image above is a PG-7VL HEAT round, introduced by the Soviet union in 1977 as a further improvement to the earlier PG-7VM (1969) and PG-7VS (1972) projectiles. The PG-7VL is 93mm in diameter, weighs approximately 2.6kg, and contains 730g of OKFOL explosive compound. It is capable of penetrating more than 500mm of RHA, or 1.1m of reinforced concrete. It is primarily intended for use against armoured targets, but the significant quantity of explosive material means that it is an effective weapon for engaging field emplacements or light structures. The photo above comes from a series of images purporting to show captured materiel sent from Libya and intended for the FSA  [Note: this is a known pro-Assad government website]. These projectiles did not actually make it into Syria, however others most certainly did. The shipping document below, photographed by C.J. Chivers in Jebel al-Zawiya last month, describes the delivery of a case of six PG-7VL projectiles from the Russian state-owned GK Rosvooruzhenie (the precursor to today’s JSC Rosoboronexport) to the Syrian Ministry of Defence, in November 1998. The document refers specifically to case 974/1001. Were all 1001 cases to contain PG-7VL projectiles packaged in the same manner, the contract may have been for over 6,000 rounds. I have annotated the document with English translations, as provided to me.

A note on RPG-7 projectile designations: When dealing with the projectiles of the Soviet Union/Russia (and several other former Eastern Bloc countries), the ‘V’ in the designation stands for ‘vystrel‘, or ’round’, referring to both the projectile, and the propellant (or in this case expelling) charge. This expelling charge, often referred to as a booster section, launches the projectile out of the barrel (at 117m/s, in the case of a PG-7V), before the rocket sustainer motor kicks in around the 11m mark, accelerating the projectile towards its maximum velocity (294m/s, in the case of the PG-7V). Hence ‘PG-7′ refers specifically to the projectile alone, whilst ‘PG-7V’ refers to the round in its entirety (whether assembled or not). 

Many thanks to C.J. Chivers, Lens Young Homsi, MP.net member m4rs75, and sources who have elected to remain anonymous. Cheers also to Travis Owen for assisting with the translation of the Arabic text, to Ivan Kochin for assistance with the Russian text, to Alex Diehl for technical input, and to fellow members of BOCN for their assistance. 

Should you have more images of RPG-7 projectiles in Syria, please don’t hesitate to get in touch with me. 

There have been a number of claims, both from the ground in Syria and from media abroad, that Syrian government forces have been using white phosphorus (WP) munitions to target rebel positions or civilian populations. Unfortunately, these reports appear to be confusing the appearance of ZAB series cluster bomb submunitions (likely ZAB-2.5 submunitions) with that of certain WP munitions. To date, I have seen no evidence of WP use by either side in the Syrian conflict. Update16/12/2012: I have observed what is likely limited use of WP munitions in Syria. More here. Note that many sources are still misidentifying ZAB-2.5 subs (and possibly ZAB series conventional bombs) as WP.

This Al Jazeera report is typical of the claims of WP use I have seen to date. Note that the still image at the end of the report appears to show a WP munition, though this is likely a file photo. If someone knows this not to be the case, please get in touch with me.

Famous images and video depicting the use of WP munitions by the IDF in Gaza in 2008/2009 have provided many people with their understanding of the appearance of WP munitions. One of the most recognisable features in these is the many tell-tale ‘snakelike’ trails of smoke associated with M825A1 155mm WP projectiles, and similar. The M825A1 is designed to produce a dispersed smokescreen by ejecting 116 ¾ inch felt wedges impregnated with WP over the target location. These wedges ignite upon contact with the air, and fall to the ground burning. The twisting trails left by this process have earned the projectile the nickname of ‘Medusa’ in some artillery circles.

Other WP munitions are unitary in design, however, and have quite a different dispersal pattern. The M110A1 155m projectile is one such example; see this video for an example of its detonation.

The detonation of RBK-250 ZAB-2.5 cluster bombs (and other, similar cluster munitions) exhibits similar characteristics to that of cargo WP munitions, such as the M825A1, when such munitions are employed in an airburst fashion. Because ZAB-2.5 submunitions are ignited upon ejection from the cluster bomb they are carried in, they fall to the ground burning – appearing somewhat like the wedges of burning WP described above. There are some notable differences, however:

1. ZAB-2.5 submunitions are much larger than the small pieces of WP in most cargo munitions of that type.
2. ZAB-2.5 submunitions ejected from an RPK-250 ZAB-2.5 are fewer in number than WP wedges ejected from munitions such as the M825A1. The RBK-250 ZAB-2.5 cluster bomb carries 48 ZAB-2.5 submunitions, whereas the M825A1 projectile carries 116 wedges of WP-impregnated felt.
3. Whilst both munitions emit smoke whilst descending and once on the ground, WP wedges will produce more smoke for their size, and will generally produce a smoke that is thicker and whiter in appearance.  (This does not Take into account other materiel ignited by either type of munition).
4. Some ZAB series submunitions contain bursting charges, which will explode after a given time, discouraging people from attempting to extinguish the submunitions.
5. ZAB submunitions will often leave behind burnt-out remnants of their casing, whereas WP will leave only small lumps of unoxidised WP, if anything. Remnants of the carrier munitions will be left behind in both cases, and may assist with differential identification.

The image below shows an M825A1 155mm WP projectile exploding over Gaza in 2009. The video shows what is likely an RBK-250 ZAB-2.5 cluster bomb deploying submunitions over Deir ez-Zour in Syria.

This article should not be taken as a definitive statement that no WP munitions have been used in Syria, simply that I have yet to see any evidence of such. Should anyone have information to the contrary, please contact me!

I will have more on WP munitions in an upcoming article, looking at Israeli 155mm projectiles in the most recent Gaza conflict. Gaza image copyright Getty Images. M825A1 diagram taken from an official US government publication.

As always, an arms specialist (preferably several) should be consulted before confirming a positive ID on any arms or munitions. For journalists, media organisations, and NGOs, the RRMA can assist with this process.

Remember, submunitions are particularly dangerous. Attempts to extinguish ZAB-2.5 submunitions, in particular, could place you at risk of being injured by the bursting charges. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area

•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance

•MARK the area to warn others

•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities

A 9M79-1 missile being fired in Kazakhstan during exercise Combat Commonwealth 2011. Credit: Grigoriy Bedenko.

The 9K79 Tochka (Точка; ‘point’) tactical ballistic missile launcher has been identified in a recent video from Syria, seen below. Whilst the YouTube video misidentifies the system as a ‘Scud’, it is almost certainly a 9K79, also referred to as the OTR-21 (OTR: оперативно-тактический ракетный комплекс, or ‘Tactical-operational Missile Complex’), or by its NATO reporting name, the SS-21 Scarab. This Soviet-produced system has a maximum range of 70km, and a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of approximately 150m. An updated version, the 9K79-1 Tochka-U (Scarab-B), was introduced in the 1980s with a maximum range of 120km and a CEP of approximately 92m. Syria is thought to possess both iterations, having received its first deliveries of the earlier 9K79 (Scarab-A) systems from the USSR in 1983. Syria is suspected of supplying 9K79s to North Korea to be reverse-engineered for use in their domestic missile development program.

Two 9K79 or 9K79-1 tactical ballistic missile systems operating in Syria.

The 9K79/9K79-1 is a mobile missile launch system, consisting of the 9M79 solid-fuel missile and the 9P129 6×6 wheeled Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). Various payloads can be delivered by the 9M79 missile, including HE-frag warheads, submunitions, and nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. A passive radar-homing HE warhead also exists. Syria is known to possess 9M79F (9M79-1F, for the 9K79-1) missiles with 9N123F 120kg HE-fragmentation warheads, and may also possess 9M79K (9M79-1K, for the 9K79-1) missiles, featuring the 9N123K cargo warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions. It is also possible that Syria has purchased or developed delivery systems for chemical or biological weapons.

Diagrams of the 9N123F and 9N123K warheads described above.

The 9P129 (or one of several later variations) TEL vehicle is based on the Object (объект) 5921 6×6 wheeled vehicle, which also serves as a base for the 9A33 TEL for the 9K33 Osa surface-to-air missile system (NATO reporting name: SA-8 Gecko). The 9P129 has a road speed of approximately 60km/h, is fully amphibious, air-transportable, and provided with NBC protection. A trained crew can setup and ready a missile for launch in around 15-20 minutes from a previously mobile position.  9K79-1 systems were used by Russian forces in the both Chechen Wars and in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict.

9K79-1 Tochka-U systems on parade in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Credit: Фальшивомонетчик (Wikimedia).

The presence of these systems is an interesting development; they are certainly a lot more accurate than the 9K52 Luna-M (FROG-7) rockets and R-17/R-17M (Scud-B/Scud-C) missiles which Syria also possesses. Please note that many media outlets are incorrectly reporting any large rocket or missile as a ‘Scud’. This confusion is partly due to US government-issued statements referring to ‘Scud-type’ missiles. All systems should be positively identified before being referred to as ‘Scuds’, and it should be noted that there are significant differences between the different missiles collectively referred to as ‘Scuds’. Should any readers see further evidence of 9K79/9K79-1 use in Syria, please contact me.

Remember, all unexploded munitions are dangerous. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area

•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance

•MARK the area to warn others

•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities

My thanks to Yuri Lyamin, Alex Diehl, and Ivan Kochin for their assistance with this piece. 

Recently, Sakr 122mm cargo rockets and their submunitions have been observed within Syria. This family of 122mm rockets is designed for use with the Russian BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (the so-called ‘Grad’, or ‘hail’) and other 122mm systems such as the Chinese Type 81 SPRL and Egyptian RL-21 and RC-21 launch vehicles. These surface-to-surface multiple rocket launcher systems are not designed for precise fires, but instead target wide areas; this effect is, of course, even more pronounced when firing submunition-dispensing rockets from these systems. Despite multiple reports to the contrary, these munitions are not Iranian, but were produced in Egypt at the Sakr Factory for Development Industries, a subsidiary of the Egyptian Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI). The AOI logo can be seen very clearly on the rocket in the video below, and the full name along with ‘Sakr Factory’ can be seen printed on the rockets in Arabic in the images at the bottom of this article.

Sakr 122mm rockets are produced with high explosive (HE), leaflet, or submunition payloads. It is also believed that mine-dispensing and illumination varieties have been manufactured. Sakr 122mm rockets have been produced in four lengths, with designations of Sakr-10, Sakr-18, Sakr-36, and Sakr-45, for their approximate ranges. In reality, the maximum range varies depending on the payload of the rocket. Cargo rockets are produced in the -18, -36, and -45 varieties, with effective ranges of 17, 31, and 42 kilometres, respectively. The Sakr-10 and Sakr-18 models feature ‘S-form’ folding fins (as seen on the Soviet/Russian 9M22U and other 122mm rockets), whilst the Sakr-36 and Sakr-45 feature straight fins, as seen in the video above. Whilst the video description claims there were ‘over 100 bomb[lets]’, this is unlikely. Sakr-18 and Sakr-45 rockets contain 72 submunitions each, whilst Sakr-36 rockets contain 98. A mechanical time fuze causes the submunitions to eject from the carrier rocket (believed to occur at approximately 700m above ground, in the case of the Sakr series rockets). The fuze and rocket nose cone can be seen in the image below (credit).  

Whilst information on the submunitions themselves is scarce, it appears that early rockets were loaded with Soviet and Chinese submunitions, including Chinese Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) derived from US designs. Later rockets, including those in current production, are loaded with copies of the US M77 submunition; these are probably Egyptian-produced copies, although some may have been manufactured in China. Some western sources refer to this later submunition as an ‘M42D’, though it is unclear where this designation originates (other than the obvious allusion to the US M42 submunition). It is not clear whether this is an internal designation, or a term applied by an observer at a later date. The submunitions observed appear to be copies of the US M77 submunition, rather than the M42, and feature the wider ribbon necessary to arm the munition when released from a cargo rocket. The bomblets pictures are one of two confirmed submunitions known to be used with Sakr 122mm rockets, and are sometimes referred to simply as the ‘Sakr Type B’ submunition. Both the ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’ appear to be copies of the US M77.

M77 submunitions, and the related M42 and M46, have been widely copied throughout the globe. Nonetheless, they all operate in a similar basic fashion, as follows: Once the submunitions are ejected from the carrier the ribbon unfurls in the airstream. This ribbon flutters as it falls, causing motion that unscrews a ‘screw’ (threaded firing pin) it is attached to. Once unscrewed, a spring-loaded detonator slide safety is released to the side of the munition, leaving the screw directly above the detonator. Impact inertia drives the screw into the detonator upon impact. If the submunition impacts on an angle, or has its fall broken by foliage or similar, it may fail to detonate. This leaves the screw perilously close to the detonator, and any wind can cause the ribbon to move the screw back and forth across the face of the detonator. Submunitions found in such a state are extremely dangerous. One EOD specialist who I spoke with had the following to say:

I worked for several years cleaning up after firings of the US MLRS with the M77; we had the utmost respect for the sensitivity of the detonator. If the wind reached 6 knots at ground level we would depart the range area, any movement of the ribbon on dud munitions could potentially cause detonation. Normally we could not just quit for the day, so we would retreat to our safe zone to play cards and wait to see if the wind died down. On numerous occasions while waiting we would have detonations within the area from wind disturbance.

The submunitions seen in the video above appear, in most cases, to have failed to arm. However, towards the end of the video a submunition with an armed fuze can be seen (circled in image below). This is extremely dangerous to move, handle, or approach.

Remember, all unexploded munitions – especially submunitions such as these – are dangerous. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities  

Should any readers have further information on the submunitions used with Sakr 122mm rockets, or new photos or footage of such rockets or submunitions, please get in touch. My thanks to Jeff Osborne, Michael Weber, Peter White, Neil Marshall, and Travis Owen for their assistance with this piece. 

Additional Material

This promotional video from AOI/Sakr FDI is available on my YouTube Channel:

This series of photos was taken by Nicole Tung, a professional photographer, in Jebel al-Zawiyah. Note the markings, submunition characteristics, and fragmentation matrix.

Following are two more safety sheets I produced for the RRMA, as part of a package provided to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to support their ongoing efforts in Syria. The content of these  is drawn largely from previous posts here. There are one-sheets for the ZAB-2.5 incendiary and Sakr Type B submunitions, as well as a general sheet (above) outlining the four different submunitions identified at the time of publication. We have since observed the presence of ShOAB-0.5 submunitions as well, which I will discuss briefly below.

ZAB-2.5 incendiary submunitions one-sheet, detailing the three variants and their respective compositions. Remember, attempting to extinguish these submunitions may be extremely hazardous.

Sakr Type B submunitions one-sheet. Remember, these submunitions can be particularly dangerous due to their fuzing and detonation method. Even the wind can cause these type of munitions to detonate unexpectedly. 

ShOAB-0.5 submunitions have also been identified in Syria in recent weeks. ‘ShOAB’ stands for Sharikovaya Oskolochnaya Aviatsionnaya Bomba, or ‘spherical fragmentation aircraft bomb’, and describes the fragmentation (anti-personnel) effect of these submunitions. The ShOAB-0.5 is loaded into the RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5 cargo bomb, which contains a nominal 565 submunitions (+/- 5 pieces). Assembled, these bombs are 1950mm long, and weigh 334kg.  It should be noted that the diagram above shows a model without the aerodynamic fairing (nose cone). The bomb contains a central bursting charge for dispersing its payload. The ShOAB-0.5 bomblets themselves are derived from the US BLU-26 (and similar) series submunitions, and weigh approximately 417g each. They are 60mm diameter spheres containing approximately 304 steel balls which act as shrapnel when dispersed by the 70g of TG-30 explosive compound (30% TNT, 70% RDX) contained within the cast steel shell.

Update 07/05/2013: Impartial Bias over at MP.net sent me the following video, showing several ShOAB-0.5 subs in Syria.

Remember, submunitions are particularly dangerous. As always, if you see any UXO, remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

Recently, both sides involved in the fighting in Syria have accused the other of chemical weapons (CW) use. Remnants of similar items were found in two alleged chemical attacks in Saraqeb, Idlib and Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo. Eliot Higgins has gone into a little more detail on the items in question. Whilst the munitions can not be conclusively identified, they do not appear to match any known CW delivery devices, including known smaller devices intended for special operations. Less than an hour ago, Jeffry Ruigendijk published a series of photos on his website, showing a fighter from the Al-Nusra Front (an Al Qaeda-associated rebel group in Syria) with what appears to be one of the grenades in question.

Whilst not matching any CW delivery devices known to me or to the CW specialists I spoke with, the munitions do appear quite similar to those produced by the Indian Border Security Force’s Tear Smoke Unit (TSU), at their plant in Tekanpur, Madhya Pradesh. Several of their production items appear to share  physical similarities with the unidentified grenade, but the closest visual  match is their ‘Tear Smoke Chilli Grenade’, seen below. This grenade contains a combination of CS gas ( 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) and ‘synthetic chilli’ (likely a synthetic capsaicin, such as nonivamide) – both common riot control agents.

Whilst this is certainly not an exact visual match, it may point to similarities present in other (perhaps older or newer) products which TSU manufactures, or copies, variants, or similar munitions produced by other countries. The white plastic-cased grenade in the image at top does not feature any discernible markings, which is possibly consistent with the removal of the adhesive labels seen on TSU’s products. The safety lever (AKA ‘fly-off lever’ or ‘spoon’) appears to be of similar design, although there appear to be differences in the fuze design. This Indian news article notes that Turkey purchased 10,025 munitions from TSU in 2007, which may indicate a possible avenue of supply, particularly if the grenades were in the hands of rebel forces, as the image at top appears to indicate.

Of course, this grenade remains unidentified, and we cannot conclusively rule out the use of CW, but it seems increasingly less likely that chemical weapons were used in the two attacks in question.

Update 09/05/2013: Benjamin Hiller has forwarded me a link to the Nanxing Chemical General factory in China, who also offer a squat, plastic-cased riot control grenade. This product appears to combine the effects of a flashbang grenade with CS gas. Whilst, again, this is certainly not an ID, it does show similar products being produced in China, who are known to have supplied numerous arms and munitions to Syria.

Update 09/05/2013 (0700 GMT): Along with TSU, I also got in touch with another Indian company manufacturing less-lethal munitions. Premier Explosives Limited (PEL), based in Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh, describe themselves as “the only pvt. Sector Co, which produces TEAR GAS SHELL”. Their device, pictured below, also bears physical resemblance to the grenade in question, as well as to the TSU products. PEL‘s President -Business Development emailed me, to confirm the munitions seen in Syria were not produced by their factory:

“The grenade shown in the photograph looks similar to the one that is produced by us, however the one shown in the photograph is not ours.”

He noted that their OC-based munitions are provided to the Indian Army and internal security forces in India, although the devices are available for export. 

My thanks to Mike Weber, Eliot Higgins, Benjamin Hiller, as well as a CW specialist who wishes to remain unnamed. A special hat tip is due to Aris Roussinos, who pointed us all in the direction of TSU. 

I have emailed the BSF, and the TSU specifically, and asked them for assistance in identifying these munitions and any possible diversion. This post will be updated to reflect their reply, if any.
Should anyone recognise the grenade pictured, or have any other suggestions for identification, please get in touch.

The image above, a screenshot from a recently uploaded video, appears to show a fully assembled 9K338 Igla-S (NATO reporting name: SA-24 Grinch) in the hands of rebel forces in Syria. The fighters, from the Alasala Watanmia Front, exhibit four different man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in the video uploaded on May 30, 2013. From left to right in the video, as seen below, we see a 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7b Grail), Chinese FN-6, 9K338 Igla-S, and 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet). The three Soviet/Russian systems appear to be complete, featuring missile launch tube, gripstock, and BCU (battery coolant unit). The Chinese FN-6 appears to be lacking its BCU in the video. It is unknown, of course, whether any of the weapons shown are in functioning condition. The video was apparently shot in the Aleppo region.

An earlier video, posted in February by the ‘Armoured Brigade Aleppo’ also appears to show a handful of 9K338 systems, including BCUs and gripstocks. These two videos are the only examples I have seen of complete 9K338 systems in Syria, although some previous reporting and blogging has shown incomplete systems. Western governments and reporters have expressed concern over the 9K338 system in the past, with some confusion around the presence of the missile in Libya. The 9K338 is substantially more capable than the far more common 9K32 (SA-7a) and 9K32M (SA-7b) MANPADS which are found in conflict zones throughout the world, and have been used in attacks against civilian airliners. Older systems are easily defeated by the electronic countermeasures of modern fighter aircraft, however the 9K338 poses a more significant threat to some of the slightly older combat aircraft still in use with many forces in the region.

Update 11/06/2013: @Guardian_Mario has provided the image below, a panorama showing the missile systems and captured military vehicles exhibited by the Alasala Watanmia Front.

My thanks to Yuri Lyamin for the heads-up on these. 

Anti-Assad fighters from the Mujahid Battalion of the Caucasus Emirate have posted a Russian-language video to their website, outlining how to modify the VP-7M type fuze to disable the self-destruct mechanism present in PG-7 type warheads. Typically, these warheads self-destruct at around the 920m mark. Disabling this feature extends the maximum range of the weapon, though its accuracy would be very limited. A US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) bulletin from 1975 assessed the accuracy of the RPG-7 firing the PG-7V round against a 7.5 x 15 foot panel moving at 9 miles per hour at various ranges. The report concluded that at 500m, the chance of a successful first-round hit was only 4%. Fired in this modified fashion, the weapon would be useful only for attacks against area targets, such as massed concentrations of troops or vehicles, military bases, or urban areas. It would also require the gunner to practice extensively at these ranges, which seems unlikely to occur.

Remember, all munitions are dangerous. You should not approach, handle, or modify munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any unexploded ordnance (UXO), remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities 

A hat tip to Aris Roussinos for spotting this video, and my thanks to Alex Diehl for his help with the post. 

UPDATE: I have posted an update containing several important details. 

UPDATE 31/08/2013: A second update including more details is available here.

In recent days, the world’s attention has been focused on the alleged chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Syria. This post will seek to examine the alleged delivery system used in these attacks, and provide a preliminary analysis of the capabilities and features of such. This is a preliminary analysis only, and should be treated as such. My hope in posting this piece is that it will inform the conversation, and help cut through some of the wild guesses and outrageous claims regarding these munitions that I have seen over the past few days. Nothing in this post should be considered definitive. Additionally, I will not be attempting to establish which side employed chemical weapons, nor indeed if CW were employed at all. These are questions best answered by CW specialists on the ground (such as the UN team in Syria). The earliest video of this munition type that I have seen is from January 2013, and the devices match with those recorded at earlier alleged CW attacks.

Note: this piece is intended as a follow-up to my earlier, preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions claimed to have been used to deliver chemical agents in Syria. It will repeat a little of the material covered in the earlier piece as it is intended to be translated and made available in Arabic. It should be stressed that this is still a preliminary analysis of the limited photographic and videographic material available. It is still not clear whether these munitions carried a CW payload, nor are their origins yet known.

UPDATE 31/08/2013: A second update including more details is available here. It appears increasingly likely that munitions of this variety are produced in at least two sizes.
UPDATE 07/09/2013: An earlier version of this post, translated into Arabic, is available here.

In an earlier post, I conducted a preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions alleged to have been used in suspected chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Syria, particularly the attack in Eastern Ghouta. The video below shows the delivery, loading, and launching of one of these unidentified munitions, apparently by regime forces. The video, which was announced on the ‘Darya Revolution’ Facebook page, claims to show the launch of a rocket with a CW payload from Mezzeh Military Airport, on the Western edge of Damascus, towards Eastern Ghouta. The rocket in the video is a strong match for the type of munitions documented in Daraya, Khaladiya, Yabroud, Adra, Eastern Ghouta, and Zamalka (see complete list at the end of this piece).

The video shows several men around the launch site wearing red berets, which is apparently typical of the uniform worn by the Syrian Republican Guard. This is consistent with reports from Israeli sources that rockets containing chemical agents were fired by the 155^th Brigade, 4^th Armoured Division, which is closely aligned with the Republican Guard. Both units are commanded by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brother, Maher al-Assad. The 155^th Brigade’s base is believed to be close to Mezzeh airport. Eliot Higgins has calculated the precise impact location of one of the unidentified munitions, with findings that may indicate similar launch sites. It is interesting to note that the figures loading and firing the weapon appear to be in civilian attire, rather than the military uniforms seen on others in the video.

[UPDATE: it appears increasingly likely that these munitions have been produced in at least two sizes. Whilst Falaq-2 launchers, or close copies or derivatives appear to be in use with munitions of this type (see below), this launcher may be a larger calibre system developed along similar lines.] These are seen in one, two, three, and four-tube configurations, and have been seen fitted to both military and civilian type trucks and semi-trailers. These may have been acquired from Iran, or may be a copy of the Iranian design. Falaq-2 type launchers are known to be in use with government forces in Syria already, having been reported towards the end of last year. Typically, the Falaq-2 launcher is used in conjunction with a 333mm FL2-A rocket of 1820mm in length, carrying a high explosive (HE) warhead – considerably shorter than the unidentified munition in question, which appears to be at the very least 2800mm (and possibly upwards of 3000mm) in length. The video below, Published in December 2012, shows a two-tube Falaq-2 type launcher being fired from Mezzeh Military Airport, allegedly towards Daraya. This is consistent with the claims accompanying the video above.

The munitions themselves are non-standard surface-to-surface rockets of at least 2800mm in length. The long motor body is likely designed to increase the static margin of the rocket, which would improve stability in flight. It is possible that these munitions are produced in differing lengths. Given they are fired from a Falaq-2 type launcher, the diameter of the munitions is likely close to 333mm. It is possible there is a larger diameter variant produced. It is unclear whether the rockets are manufactured in Iran – they do bear some similarities to other munitions thought to be produced there – or whether they were produced in Syria to suit the Iranian launch system. The tail of the munitions (pictured below) features a straight fin assembly with a ring aerofoil, and a single large exhaust nozzle for the rocket motor. The payload section of the weapon is notably larger than the body section and approximately the same diameter as the fin assembly (possibly slightly larger). It appears to be thin walled, which would indicate the requirement for a high fill-to-weight ratio. However, this would be decreased by the large central body section. One suggestion which was made to me is that the munition is a slip-fit modification of an existing rocket. The bolt seen in the tail image below may have been threaded into the outer material as a pressure hold, typical of a sleeve fit mechanism.

Given their build quality and uniformity of appearance, these munitions are unlikely to be improvised devices.

It is possible that these munitions are not CW delivery devices at all, and are designed to carry a fuel-air explosive (FAE) or HE payload. FAE rockets of similar construction can be seen in the US Surface-Launched Unit, Fuel-Air Explosive (SLUFAE) and Israeli CARPET rockets. It is also a possibility that the munitions were produced in several variants, including a CW variant, or that certain rockets were converted to carry a CW payload at some point after manufacture. FAE or HE weapons could, with varying degrees of difficulty, be converted to deliver a liquid CW payload by replacing the payload of the munition with a chemical agent. A yellow band, seen on one of the munitions (image below), may indicate a different fill type. The warhead in question appears to contain a powdered substance which is more likely to be a HE fill.

The fuze or type of fuze used with these munitions remains unknown. Whilst a Soviet ATK-EB mechanical time (MT) fuze (pictured below) was found near one of these munitions in Eastern Ghouta, it is unclear whether this was from the rocket itself, or from another munition (perhaps related to the airstrikes that followed the alleged CW attack). A MT fuze, whilst a viable option for rockets of this type, would not be the ideal choice. It is also worth noting that the majority of the munitions recorded appear to have functioned as intended. If a MT fuze was used, this may indicate that the operating party was familiar with the weapon system and capable of effectively calculating and setting the MT fuzes to their appropriate delays.

The earliest video of this type of munition appears to be from an attack in Daraya in January of this year; however, there were no claims of a CW attack at this time [Update: an image of a Falaq-2 launcher with the tail fin assembly of a loaded rocket visible has been added at the top of the page, and reproduced below. This image was taken on the 17th November, 2012 by Alzahraa Alep News, and appears consistent with the unidentified munitions]. Indeed, it appears that at least one of these munitions has been observed with what is more likely a HE payload. Videos such as the one below appear to indicate that any CW agent that may be present is either non-persistent, or that some or all of the munitions carried an alternative payload, as discussed above.

The UN chemical weapons inspection team have been filmed inspecting one of these unidentified munitions in Eastern Ghouta. In the first of the two videos below, members of the UN inspection team document and take samples from one of the munitions (note distinctive tail fin assembly in rubble at right) and its impact site. The UN team have also documented a second potential CW munition, in Medmah Sham, seen in the second video below. This is a Soviet 140mm spin-stabilised rocket generally fired from the BM-14 (-16/-17) and RPU-14 systems. It is known produced in several variants, including the M-14-OF HE-FRAG munition and the M-14D white phosphorous (WP) smoke munition. Whilst a 140mm rocket known variously as the ‘M-14-S’ or ‘MS-14′ was produced with a 2.2kg Sarin payload, it is not believed to have been in the Syrian arsenal. The system has a maximum range of approximately 9.8 kilometres. SIPRI’s trade registers indicate some 200 BM-14 systems were sold to Syria by the USSR in 1967 to 1969.

Whilst we certainly do not have enough information to positively identify the munition featured in the Mezzeh Airport launch video just yet, we can say that:

1.)   It is likely a non-standard munition produced in Iran or Syria, not widely used or manufactured, but likely not an ‘improvised’ munition;

2.)   It is a tube-launched munition, fired from an Iranian Falaq-2 type launcher or derivative or copy;

3.)   It appears to have a diameter of approximately 333mm or thereabouts at its widest points (warhead base plate and tail fin assembly), and a total length of at least 2800mm [it appears there may be several variants in length];

4.) The nature of the design means they are unlikely to be particularly long-range, nor particularly accurate;

5.) The munitions are possibly produced in at least two different sizes (one of larger diameter and greater length than detailed here).

Of course, whilst none of this material constitutes explicit evidence of a CW strike by Assad’s forces – that’s a question for the UN team – it does add more pieces to the puzzle, and documents the use of a recently unknown munition in conjunction with an Iranian type launcher, purportedly by Syrian government forces.

Here is a partial list of where the unidentified munitions have been recorded, broken down by date and location.

January 4^th, Daraya
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68YeijuMHec

June 11^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HylX8OiczHk

August 2^nd, Khalidiya (Homs)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThtLIc0iEzc

August 5^th, Yabroud
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbdM0zyNqBI

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE9SU

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tzhhhv3uHio

August 21^st, Eastern Ghouta
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kllhsgFrgN0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pc6xL-N6f5M
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2uBpDxAoJA

August 21^st, Eastern Ghouta
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16qFgAfM5jg

August 21^st, Zamalka
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FilC4CIvWk

UPDATE 29/08/2013: Included image from ‘Alzahraa Alep News’ showing an earlier Falaq-2 and what appears to be the same unidentified munition. With thanks to Joe Galvin.

UPDATE 31/08/2013: New images including rudimentary measurements, and new video footage of a presumed HE device. Available here. It appears increasingly likely that these munitions have been produced in at least two sizes. Whilst Falaq-2 launchers, or close copies or derivatives appear to be in use with munitions of this type (see two-tube model above), the launcher in the video at the top of this page may in fact be a larger calibre system developed along similar lines.

UPDATE 07/09/2013: An earlier version of this post, translated into Arabic, is available here.

UPDATE 20/09/2013: Updated top image and adjusted text to clarify possible use of different size munitions.

My thanks to Eliot Higgins, who sourced most of the video material for this post, to John Ismay, Yuri Lyamin, and BA14 for their thoughts, and to several CW and EOD specialists who wish to remain anonymous, for sharing their expertise.

Below is a brochure extract showing the Falaq-2 launcher and its FL2-A rocket, from Iran’s Defence Industries Organization.

Remember, all munitions are dangerous. You should not approach, handle, or modify munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any unexploded ordnance (UXO), remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities

This piece is an update to my two earlier pieces examining the unidentified munitions alleged to have been used in chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Syria. It should be stressed that this is still a preliminary analysis of the photographic and videographic material available. It is still not clear whether these munitions carried a CW payload, nor are their origins yet known. It appears increasingly likely that there are munitions of this variety produced in at least two different sizes. 

You can find the first piece, offering a preliminary analysis of the munitions, here.

You can find the second piece, with a more detailed analysis and examination of the launch systems, here.

New images and video of the alleged CW munitions in Syria have surfaced in the last few hours. These include higher-resolution photos of recovered components from one of these unidentified munitions, as seen in the image below, and the gallery at the bottom of this post. These images show the tail fin assembly to be somewhere in the region of 300mm in diameter. In some of the previously observed images and videos it appears that the tail fin assembly of the rocket is slightly smaller in diameter than the forward, payload-bearing section of the rocket. A diameter of 333mm or slightly less would be consistent with the munitions being fired from Iranian Falaq-2 type launchers, or similar copies or derivatives. One of the images shows the warhead baseplate quite clearly, with two access holes visible. It is not yet known what function these serve, though they may be fill ports, or related to a fuze or bursting charge fitted to the munition. In the image below, you can see that the top port is missing its cover, revealing a smaller diameter fitting within. In the case of a liquid fill, the gap between these two may have housed a rubber washer or gasket, or a sealant of some variety.

New video of one of the munitions has also been documented. The video, embedded below, shows one of the rockets captured by the ‘Holy House Brigade‘ as it is being disassembled. The rebel group are harvesting what looks to be a high explosive (HE) fill from the rocket. The fill and the thin-walled casing can be seen clearly in the video, and in the image below. The physical characteristics of this munitions largely match with one of the munitions seen in Khalidiya, Homs (and discussed in my first post on the matter). Also visible is a black band around the munition, with black numbering visible in the video. Munitions have now been documented with both black and yellow markings, and black and red numbering, though it is not yet clear what these signify. Unlike the munition pictured in the images above, the munition featured in the video and image below (and the similar rocket seen in Homs) appears to have only one hole or port in the warhead baseplate. Whilst not conclusive, this could point to a difference in fill type.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6P1uQukMwGo

Although it is difficult to ascertain from the videos and images we have seen so far, it appears increasingly likely that the munitions may have been produced with varying rocket motor lengths, payload diameters, and/or payloads.

For example, the launcher and munition in this video appear to be of a larger diameter and greater length than the Falaq-2 (333mm) systems seen in Syria. However, the construction of the munitions and, for the most part, the launcher itself seem to be very similar. On the other hand, the measurements taken from the munitions above, in conjunction with this photo indicate that Falaq-2 systems or similar copies or derivatives are likely in use with the smaller diameter munitions. More definitive information is required.

My thanks to Eliot Higgins, as well as a confidential source in Syria, and several EOD/CW specialists who wish to remain anonymous.

Remember, all munitions are dangerous. You should not approach, handle, or modify munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any unexploded ordnance (UXO), remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities