Alleged CW munitions in Syria fired from Iranian Falaq-2 type launchers

Note: this piece is intended as a follow-up to my earlier, preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions claimed to have been used to deliver chemical agents in Syria. It will repeat a little of the material covered in the earlier piece as it is intended to be translated and made available in Arabic. It should be stressed that this is still a preliminary analysis of the limited photographic and videographic material available. It is still not clear whether these munitions carried a CW payload, nor are their origins yet known.

UPDATE 31/08/2013: A second update including more details is available here. It appears increasingly likely that munitions of this variety are produced in at least two sizes.
UPDATE 07/09/2013: An earlier version of this post, translated into Arabic, is available here.

In an earlier post, I conducted a preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions alleged to have been used in suspected chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Syria, particularly the attack in Eastern Ghouta. The video below shows the delivery, loading, and launching of one of these unidentified munitions, apparently by regime forces. The video, which was announced on the ‘Darya Revolution’ Facebook page, claims to show the launch of a rocket with a CW payload from Mezzeh Military Airport, on the Western edge of Damascus, towards Eastern Ghouta. The rocket in the video is a strong match for the type of munitions documented in Daraya, Khaladiya, Yabroud, Adra, Eastern Ghouta, and Zamalka (see complete list at the end of this piece).

The video shows several men around the launch site wearing red berets, which is apparently typical of the uniform worn by the Syrian Republican Guard. This is consistent with reports from Israeli sources that rockets containing chemical agents were fired by the 155^th Brigade, 4^th Armoured Division, which is closely aligned with the Republican Guard. Both units are commanded by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brother, Maher al-Assad. The 155^th Brigade’s base is believed to be close to Mezzeh airport. Eliot Higgins has calculated the precise impact location of one of the unidentified munitions, with findings that may indicate similar launch sites. It is interesting to note that the figures loading and firing the weapon appear to be in civilian attire, rather than the military uniforms seen on others in the video.

[UPDATE: it appears increasingly likely that these munitions have been produced in at least two sizes. Whilst Falaq-2 launchers, or close copies or derivatives appear to be in use with munitions of this type (see below), this launcher may be a larger calibre system developed along similar lines.] These are seen in one, two, three, and four-tube configurations, and have been seen fitted to both military and civilian type trucks and semi-trailers. These may have been acquired from Iran, or may be a copy of the Iranian design. Falaq-2 type launchers are known to be in use with government forces in Syria already, having been reported towards the end of last year. Typically, the Falaq-2 launcher is used in conjunction with a 333mm FL2-A rocket of 1820mm in length, carrying a high explosive (HE) warhead – considerably shorter than the unidentified munition in question, which appears to be at the very least 2800mm (and possibly upwards of 3000mm) in length. The video below, Published in December 2012, shows a two-tube Falaq-2 type launcher being fired from Mezzeh Military Airport, allegedly towards Daraya. This is consistent with the claims accompanying the video above.

The munitions themselves are non-standard surface-to-surface rockets of at least 2800mm in length. The long motor body is likely designed to increase the static margin of the rocket, which would improve stability in flight. It is possible that these munitions are produced in differing lengths. Given they are fired from a Falaq-2 type launcher, the diameter of the munitions is likely close to 333mm. It is possible there is a larger diameter variant produced. It is unclear whether the rockets are manufactured in Iran – they do bear some similarities to other munitions thought to be produced there – or whether they were produced in Syria to suit the Iranian launch system. The tail of the munitions (pictured below) features a straight fin assembly with a ring aerofoil, and a single large exhaust nozzle for the rocket motor. The payload section of the weapon is notably larger than the body section and approximately the same diameter as the fin assembly (possibly slightly larger). It appears to be thin walled, which would indicate the requirement for a high fill-to-weight ratio. However, this would be decreased by the large central body section. One suggestion which was made to me is that the munition is a slip-fit modification of an existing rocket. The bolt seen in the tail image below may have been threaded into the outer material as a pressure hold, typical of a sleeve fit mechanism.

Given their build quality and uniformity of appearance, these munitions are unlikely to be improvised devices.

It is possible that these munitions are not CW delivery devices at all, and are designed to carry a fuel-air explosive (FAE) or HE payload. FAE rockets of similar construction can be seen in the US Surface-Launched Unit, Fuel-Air Explosive (SLUFAE) and Israeli CARPET rockets. It is also a possibility that the munitions were produced in several variants, including a CW variant, or that certain rockets were converted to carry a CW payload at some point after manufacture. FAE or HE weapons could, with varying degrees of difficulty, be converted to deliver a liquid CW payload by replacing the payload of the munition with a chemical agent. A yellow band, seen on one of the munitions (image below), may indicate a different fill type. The warhead in question appears to contain a powdered substance which is more likely to be a HE fill.

The fuze or type of fuze used with these munitions remains unknown. Whilst a Soviet ATK-EB mechanical time (MT) fuze (pictured below) was found near one of these munitions in Eastern Ghouta, it is unclear whether this was from the rocket itself, or from another munition (perhaps related to the airstrikes that followed the alleged CW attack). A MT fuze, whilst a viable option for rockets of this type, would not be the ideal choice. It is also worth noting that the majority of the munitions recorded appear to have functioned as intended. If a MT fuze was used, this may indicate that the operating party was familiar with the weapon system and capable of effectively calculating and setting the MT fuzes to their appropriate delays.

The earliest video of this type of munition appears to be from an attack in Daraya in January of this year; however, there were no claims of a CW attack at this time [Update: an image of a Falaq-2 launcher with the tail fin assembly of a loaded rocket visible has been added at the top of the page, and reproduced below. This image was taken on the 17th November, 2012 by Alzahraa Alep News, and appears consistent with the unidentified munitions]. Indeed, it appears that at least one of these munitions has been observed with what is more likely a HE payload. Videos such as the one below appear to indicate that any CW agent that may be present is either non-persistent, or that some or all of the munitions carried an alternative payload, as discussed above.

The UN chemical weapons inspection team have been filmed inspecting one of these unidentified munitions in Eastern Ghouta. In the first of the two videos below, members of the UN inspection team document and take samples from one of the munitions (note distinctive tail fin assembly in rubble at right) and its impact site. The UN team have also documented a second potential CW munition, in Medmah Sham, seen in the second video below. This is a Soviet 140mm spin-stabilised rocket generally fired from the BM-14 (-16/-17) and RPU-14 systems. It is known produced in several variants, including the M-14-OF HE-FRAG munition and the M-14D white phosphorous (WP) smoke munition. Whilst a 140mm rocket known variously as the ‘M-14-S’ or ‘MS-14′ was produced with a 2.2kg Sarin payload, it is not believed to have been in the Syrian arsenal. The system has a maximum range of approximately 9.8 kilometres. SIPRI’s trade registers indicate some 200 BM-14 systems were sold to Syria by the USSR in 1967 to 1969.

Whilst we certainly do not have enough information to positively identify the munition featured in the Mezzeh Airport launch video just yet, we can say that:

1.)   It is likely a non-standard munition produced in Iran or Syria, not widely used or manufactured, but likely not an ‘improvised’ munition;

2.)   It is a tube-launched munition, fired from an Iranian Falaq-2 type launcher or derivative or copy;

3.)   It appears to have a diameter of approximately 333mm or thereabouts at its widest points (warhead base plate and tail fin assembly), and a total length of at least 2800mm [it appears there may be several variants in length];

4.) The nature of the design means they are unlikely to be particularly long-range, nor particularly accurate;

5.) The munitions are possibly produced in at least two different sizes (one of larger diameter and greater length than detailed here).

Of course, whilst none of this material constitutes explicit evidence of a CW strike by Assad’s forces – that’s a question for the UN team – it does add more pieces to the puzzle, and documents the use of a recently unknown munition in conjunction with an Iranian type launcher, purportedly by Syrian government forces.

Here is a partial list of where the unidentified munitions have been recorded, broken down by date and location.

January 4^th, Daraya
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68YeijuMHec

June 11^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HylX8OiczHk

August 2^nd, Khalidiya (Homs)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThtLIc0iEzc

August 5^th, Yabroud
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbdM0zyNqBI

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE9SU

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c

August 5^th, Adra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tzhhhv3uHio

August 21^st, Eastern Ghouta
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kllhsgFrgN0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pc6xL-N6f5M
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2uBpDxAoJA

August 21^st, Eastern Ghouta
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16qFgAfM5jg

August 21^st, Zamalka
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5FilC4CIvWk

UPDATE 29/08/2013: Included image from ‘Alzahraa Alep News’ showing an earlier Falaq-2 and what appears to be the same unidentified munition. With thanks to Joe Galvin.

UPDATE 31/08/2013: New images including rudimentary measurements, and new video footage of a presumed HE device. Available here. It appears increasingly likely that these munitions have been produced in at least two sizes. Whilst Falaq-2 launchers, or close copies or derivatives appear to be in use with munitions of this type (see two-tube model above), the launcher in the video at the top of this page may in fact be a larger calibre system developed along similar lines.

UPDATE 07/09/2013: An earlier version of this post, translated into Arabic, is available here.

UPDATE 20/09/2013: Updated top image and adjusted text to clarify possible use of different size munitions.

My thanks to Eliot Higgins, who sourced most of the video material for this post, to John Ismay, Yuri Lyamin, and BA14 for their thoughts, and to several CW and EOD specialists who wish to remain anonymous, for sharing their expertise.

Below is a brochure extract showing the Falaq-2 launcher and its FL2-A rocket, from Iran’s Defence Industries Organization.

Remember, all munitions are dangerous. You should not approach, handle, or modify munitions unless explicitly trained to do so. You can visit RRMA for more information. As always, if you see any unexploded ordnance (UXO), remember the ‘ARMS’ acronym:

•AVOID the area
•RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance
•MARK the area to warn others
•SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities